If you ask any marketer what keeps them up at night, chances are high that ad 欺诈 是最重要的吗. 你能责怪他们吗? 去年 数字广告 欺诈 全球广告商为此花费了230多亿美元. Now, these same problems are coming to a TV near you.
这是正确的, the same digital capabilities that have marketers salivating over CTV--granular targeting, 醒目的测量, to name a couple - are also opening the doors for 欺诈sters to start siphoning money away from advertisers. 据估计，欺诈者已经偷走了 $1.40亿美元通过CTV using a variety of methods that capitalize on the open ecosystem and the absence of javascript.
只要看看 ICEBUCKET这是一个大型的联网电视广告 欺诈 操作 that leveraged server-side ad insertion (SSAI) to send 1.9 billion ad requests per day and spoof two million consumers in 30 different countries. Or 迪卡普里奥, where advertisers were tricked into believing that they were buying CTV ads on premium Roku publishers like CBS 新闻, 狐狸, 和PBS, when in fact they were purchasing inventory on a mobile app.
最重要的是，一个七位数的广告 欺诈 计划被认为 君主 misrepresented inventory to trick marketers like Lexus, Geico, and Jaguar into buying passive experiences like a screensaver app, instead of content from the public domain such as episodes of 《活宝三人组 or 安迪·格里菲斯秀.
和 今年的前期支出下降了33%, 这个问题只会变得更糟, as marketers will turn to programmatic to allocate an exponentially larger portion of their marketing budget. So, how can we stop this multi-billion dollar problem that is plaguing CTV? Let’s start by identifying how these flagship CTV 欺诈 这些计划本可以停止.
不要再犯同样的错误
CTV的主要方法之一 欺诈 is SSAI, which is used in roughly 40% of OTT ad serving and can be seen in action via ICEBUCKET. SSAI essentially creates a loophole for 欺诈sters, allowing them to get access to IP addresses and pretend to send traffic from reputable vendors. 和 the OTT environment lacking javascript, detection by most traditional third-party verifiers is next to impossible.
The best way to avoid this on CTV is to work closely with reputable SSAI vendors to understand and validate their credentials. 在适用情况下, 让他们记录下所有频道的细节, 用户代理详细信息, 以及它们发送的流量的IP地址. It’s important to observe trends such as high video completion rates, 流量高峰, 设备数量, 投标价格, 等. All of this needs to be investigated more thoroughly, as this is a telltale sign that may indicate some sort of large-scale 欺诈 操作.
另一种广泛使用的方法是 "平台不匹配," where 欺诈sters disguise mobile inventory as CTV ads to capitalize on the higher CPMs. This was the backbone of the 君主 操作 and resulted in advertisers paying exponentially higher prices for lower value inventory. The best way to avoid this is by leveraging user agents to identify the device ad requests that are coming, which enables the ability to differentiate between a CTV and a mobile device.
诈骗者也在使用 app ID欺骗 to have low-quality apps pretend to be something more premium to deliver the ads. 还有成千上万的流媒体应用, it’s easy to buy a knockoff BBC app if you don’t identify a catalog of all the CTV apps and app IDs out there, and actively assess if the app ID sent is accurate.
还有各种其他的方法 欺诈 like bots that send invalid, non-human traffic to apps. Or abnormal activity symbolized by things like 24-hour recurring ad requests, 不断变化的设备id, 高用户量, which all raise red flags that need to be looked at. And 欺诈sters are constantly looking for new ways to siphon money from the ad ecosystem, which is why they are even purchasing data on how humans actually interact with apps so they can more closely emulate it.
CTV 欺诈 已经是一个数十亿美元的问题了吗, 如果这个行业退居二线, 不干涉的方法, 事态可能很快升级到无法控制的程度. Especially with CTV expected to fill in for a large portion of the Upfront slump, 骗子已经准备好了，我们也必须准备好. 为了停止 欺诈, it’s essential not only to identify where we went wrong in the past, but to be proactively on the lookout for any and all suspicious behavior. It’s not going to be easy, but now is the time to take the necessary steps to prevent the CTV 欺诈 problem from turning into another digital fiasco.